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‘How Far Human Rights?’ 
 
Introduction 
The two papers presented in this short human rights symposium are among the 
first fruit of a recently formed international research network, funded by the 
Leverhulme Trust. The network comprises participants from African, British, 
German, and US universities; we seek to foster intellectual exchange on issues of 
potentially common concern among African and Western philosophers, legal and 
political theorists, and social scientists. The project was originally conceived in 
the context of a global justice debate whose claims to universality of scope 
contrast markedly with the parochialism of its dominant liberal egalitarian 
theoretical framework. In its original call for applications, the Leverhulme Trust 
specified that it was looking for internationally co-operative projects that 
demonstrate ‘a refreshing departure from established working patterns’; a 
‘willingness to take appropriate risks in setting research objectives’; and a 
willingness ‘ to transcend traditional disciplinary boundaries’. Engaging in the 
kind of dialogue attempted by the current project is genuinely risky for African 
and Western participants alike: such engagement does require a departure from 
established working patterns, so risks possible self-marginalization relative to 
each participant’s relevant ‘mainstream’ research paradigm. Nor are the risks 
negligible for research outlets – academic journals such as Jurisprudence. In 
agreeing to publish symposia of the present sort they take a step into the 
unknown, with all the market risks that involves. I want to begin, therefore, by 
taking this opportunity to thank the Leverhulme Trust, the editors of 
Jurisprudence, and network participants – in the present case, especially Simon 
Hope and Kofi Quashigah – for having taken the relevant risks that have made 
this symposium possible.      
 I said that the research network seeks to engage African and Western 
scholars with one another intellectually in an attempt to overcome a currently 
overly parochial global justice debate. I should add that we are not aiming to 
arrive at a grand theoretical consensus. This would be premature, but may not in 
any case be desirable; we may each learn much more from appreciating one 
another’s differences. The two papers that make up this symposium were 
originally presented at what was in effect the project’s inaugural conference on 
African perspectives on global justice held at LSE in September 2012. In their 
respective papers, Hope and Quashigah do not explicitly engage with or respond 
to one another’s positions – they simply try to articulate, each from their own 
immediate contextual experience, some of their reservations about all too 
ubiquitous human rights reasoning. Both come at the topic from different 
disciplinary perspectives: Quashigah is Dean of Law at the University of Ghana, 
Legon, Hope is Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Stirling. Yet there are 
clear points of contact between the two papers. Let me begin with a few remarks 
on each paper; I shall then ask how advocates of divergent human rights 
perspective may respond to the two moderately skeptical positions here 
presented. 
Kofi Quashigah chiefly focuses on the legal conundrums that arise for the 
typical post-colonial African state when it attempts to triangulate modern 
constitutional law with multiple systems of customary law on the one hand and 
increasingly vociferous demands for international human rights abidance on the 
other hand. Among Quashigah’s most startling conclusions is his claim that the 
local implementation of international human rights requirements often produces 
a sense of injustice among intended beneficiaries of traditional societies. 
International human rights law and modern constitutional law more generally, 
often violate peoples’ expectations of what is justly their due as conceived under 
traditional social and legal practices. Indeed, given that much international 
human rights law and advocacy seeks to secure the formal legal equality of men 
and women, it disproportionately affects those customary laws that govern 
matrimonial and property relations between husband and wife and, by 
extension, between extended families, clans and village more generally. Human 
rights legislation that would be seen as unremarkably routine because consistent 
with daily social practice in many Western countries are often perceived as 
aiming at the heart of social relations in traditional settings, threatening to rent 
these apart even when, for socio-economic reasons, the more traditional 
relations often prove the more enduring. 
One consequence of the diagnosed threefold tension between modern 
constitutional law, customary law, and international human rights law is that the 
law itself becomes contested territory. Quashigah’s analysis of a plethora of 
individual cases, including opposed verdicts in relation to factually identical 
cases, is indicative of the delicate balancing acts which individual judges perform 
in seeking to satisfy the diverging requirements of traditional, constitutional and 
international human rights law. The fact that, in reaching their verdicts, judges 
often resort to the so-called repugnancy test – itself a dubious legal relic from 
colonial times – hardly helps foster confidence among members of traditional 
society in the state’s role as impartial adjudicator between conflicting claims.  
Quashigah’s overall verdict is a little hesitant. He does not reject 
international human rights law in principle, nor does he believe a return to pre-
colonial traditional society feasible. Yet as a lawyer, he is morally troubled by his 
frequent experience of traditional society’s perception of constitutional courts as 
meting out injustice rather than justice to its appellants. This is evidently not the 
intended role for courts. In response, one may point to unavoidable birth-pangs 
associated with the march of modernity. Quashigah notes this line of argument 
but responds appropriately: while the law must keep up with socio-economic 
change, it oversteps its authority when it is asked to engineer such change. 
Where socio-economic condition are such as to make continued reliance on 
customary law practically and morally apposite, dogmatic insistence on 
international human rights law may end up undermining the authority of law as 
impartial adjudicator of conflicts.  
In contrast to Quashigah’s legal and generally empirical approach, Simon 
Hope’s paper raises a moral-cum-conceptual question when he asks whether 
human right talk may not sometimes be ‘one thought too many’. Later on, Hope 
suggests that insistence on human rights talk may lead us to ‘get the nature of 
the injustice wrong’. More specifically, it may lead us to misunderstand the 
historical wrongs in terms that are inappropriate to the perceived character of 
their wrongness. Along the way Hope, like Quashigah, draws attention to the 
uncomfortably bi-cultural perspective from which descendants of former 
colonized peoples remain constrained to experience their social realities. Hope’s 
context is the ongoing uneasy relation between the Maori and the Pakeha (white 
settlers) of New Zealand concerning the latter’s historical commission of 
injustice against the former. Although many current non-Maori defenders of 
Maori rights cast those historical injustices and their consequences in terms of 
human rights language, the Maori themselves generally resist conflation of what 
they regard as Maori special rights with general human rights. Hope asks why 
the Maori take this stance, given that most contemporary Maori are not 
antithetical to human rights talk in general. Hope’s eventual response to his 
question is that those who invoke human rights talk in relation to ancient 
wrongs may get the nature of the injustice wrong. It is in this sense that Hope 
invokes Bernard Williams’ ‘one too many thoughts’: the problem is not that one 
can of course also characterize the ancient wrong in human rights talk but that 
doing so adds nothing – rather, there is only one reason for why the ancient 
wrong was a wrong, and human rights violations are not that reason.1  
So what is the wrong-making reason, and why are human rights an 
inappropriate way of characterizing it? Hope offers a summary account of the 
settlers’ land-grab as having amounted, from the Maori point of view, to a 
violation of Maori birthrights – birthrights the conception of which is embedded 
in general Maori metaphysics of whakapapa. These birthrights cannot be 
equated to human rights in part because not everyone has them: only the Maori 
have them, and only in relation to their particular historical land. To suggest that 
the original violation was a human rights violation is to suggest that anyone 
could in principle have had a birthright to those lands. Another way of putting 
the point is to say that the Maori consider the wrong a wrong not because their 
general human rights were violated but because their special birth-rights were. 
One might ask whether the Maori are not living in the past. The 
metaphysics of whakapapa is all very well, one might say, except that it is 
historically dead; the quicker the Maori move on the better for all concerned. 
Hope’s response to this objection is enormously subtle. The modern Maori 
appreciate that in one sense the metaphysics of whakapapa is dead – that 
modern day Maori can no longer conduct their daily lives in accordance with 
traditional Maori beliefs. But in another sense it is precisely the original injustice 
that keeps whakapapa alive. For the modern day Maori to abandon talk of Maori 
birth rights in favour of talk of human rights would amount to a betrayal of their 
ancestors, who suffered the original wrong, and who would not have been able 
to understand it in any terms other than whakapapa terms. Keeping moral faith 
with their wronged ancestors requires modern Maori to keep faith with the 
metaphysics of whakapapa in full knowledge of the fact that it is in one sense 
dead and that it cannot, in another sense, be put to rest. This is the bi-cultural 
perspective which modern Maori, as descendants of originally wronged Maori, 
find themselves condemned to live by: to substitute human rights talk for the 
violation of ancient birth rights is then to understand neither the nature of the 
original wrong nor the nature of that’s wrong’s continuing impact on modern 
Maori.   
As noted, Quashigah and Hope did not set out to write two papers that 
neatly dovetail each other. Each theorist examines the problem of human rights 
from his own post-colonial context, each brings a different disciplinary 
                                                        
1 Cf Bernard Williams, Moral Luck (Cambridge University Press, 1981), 18. 
perspective to bear on the problem. Yet the moral predicament which, on Hope’s 
account, the Maori find themselves shares much with the legal predicament 
which, on Quashigah’s account, citizens of modern African states find themselves 
in. The predicament was well described by Kwame Gyekye at a recent project 
conference in Ghana, when he contrasted what he calls ‘evolutionary connect’ 
with ‘evolutionary disconnect’.2 By the latter Gyekye means the violent 
disruption to otherwise natural cultural development occasioned by the 
experience of colonialism. Had colonialism not happened, the most likely 
historical trajectory of affected cultures would have been their ‘natural’ dynamic 
development and change – these cultures would likely have borrowed from 
diverse other cultures with which they would have come into more or less 
peaceful, more or less occasional contact. The problem of colonial disruption is 
that it created two value systems – the traditional but suppressed value system 
whose natural evolution was now arrested, and the new colonial value system 
which colonial subjects were taught to aspire to as the more civilized of the two. 
Nor did decolonization occasion a harmonious growing together of those two 
value systems: birthrights did not metamorphose into human rights, and 
customary law did not transform itself into modern state law. Hope’s analysis 
show why this failure of harmonization is not accidental: for descendants of the 
formerly colonized to align traditional values with post-colonial state law would 
be akin to their retrospectively underwriting the legitimacy of the erstwhile 
colonial violation, including the colonial denigration of traditional practices and 
beliefs. Whatever the pragmatics of such retrospective assent, morally it is not 
possible for the descendants of the formerly colonized to acquiesce in this 
manner in the violence committed against their ancestors. In consequence, many 
formerly colonized peoples live with a permanently bi-cultural perspective, 
turning to traditional courts here, and to modern state law there, to birth-rights 
here and to human rights there, often in full awareness of the fact that they are 
themselves fully at home in neither world. 
How might a human rights advocate respond to these two moderately 
skeptical papers: could or should he or she acknowledge that insistence on 
human rights implementation can result in the perception of injustice or can at 
least sometimes amount to ‘one thought too many’? One relevant difference in 
the two accounts given may be the diachronic one: while for the modern Maori, 
Maori birth-rights are in one sense dead, for the current person in a traditional 
African set-up, customary law remains very much alive. It seems to me that 
someone who subscribes to the so-called political conception of human rights 
should have no difficulty in recognizing that the ancient Maori could not have 
understood the original wrong as a human rights violation. According to the 
political conception, human rights are themselves a recent, post-1945 
development that responds primarily to the moral need for states’ respectful 
treatment of individuals.3 So proponents of the political conception should agree 
with Hope that those who characterize that historical wrong in human rights 
                                                        
2 Kwame Gyekeye, ‘Evolutionary Disconnect as a Source of Institutional 
Instability’ (unpublished conference paper, University of Ghana, March 2015)  
3 Cf. Charles Beitz, The Idea of Human Rights (Oxford University Press 2009). I 
borrow the distinction between the ‘political conception’ and the ‘orthodox view’ 
from Beitz’ book. 
terms get the nature of the original injustice wrong. Proponents of the political 
conception may not agree that modern Maori should continue to characterize the 
legacies of the original injustice in terms of the violation of birth-rights rather 
than human rights. Still, and insofar as the modern Maori are concerned about 
the original injustice rather than its legacies, proponents of the political 
conception may well agree that it is appropriate even for modern Maori’s to 
continue to invoke birth-rights in relation to that original injustice. They may of 
course also think this morally un-strategic of the present Maori, given that 
modern human rights protection has priority, for them, over past violations of 
ancient birth-rights.  
By contrast, proponents of co-called ‘orthodox views’ would presumably 
not agree that characterizing the wrong in human rights terms gets the nature of 
the injustice wrong. For them, human rights hold timelessly: slavery in ancient 
Greece was a human rights violation even if people like Aristotle did not (or 
could not have) know(n) it. Would proponents of the orthodox view say that it is 
the traditional Maori who got the nature of the injustice wrong when they 
characterized it in terms of the violation of Maori birth-rights? This seems to me 
to be an implication of the orthodox view. If human rights are valid timelessly, 
the traditional Maori were wrong to conceive of the original violation in terms of 
the violation of Maori birth-rights. Like Aristotle, they can be forgiven for not 
having realized this. Still, present day Maori should conceive the original 
violation correctly, i.e., in human rights terms. I find this implication of the 
orthodox view counterintuitive, both with regard to present Maori and with 
regard to the ancient Maori.  If the traditonal Maori could not have known that 
what they mistook for their birth-rights were actually their human rights, I do 
not understand in what sense human rights can be said to be the relevant 
category of ascription or description. If, on the other hand, they could have know 
but didn’t, I would like to hear how what the orthodox view takes to be as 
morally self-evident as the timeless universality of human rights could have 
eluded both Aristotle and the traditional Maori. If the traditional Maori had well-
grounded reason to embrace birth-rights, the present Maori should not abandon 
birth-rights talk in favour of human rights talk in relation to the historic 
injustice: if they did, they would get the nature of the original injustice wrong in 
exactly the manner Hope suggests. 
Advocates of the orthodox view may respond that so long as the present 
Maori continue to invoke the violation of special birth-rights, the Pakeha will not 
know what they are talking about since the Pakeha do not share the metaphysics 
of whakapapa. From the Pakeha point of view, no violation then happened at all. 
In other words, Maori birth-rights lack the requisite universal form that would 
enable both sides to acknowledge that a wrong was committed. The orthodox 
view can demonstrate to both sides that a wrong was perpetrated, albeit not the 
wrong which the ancient Maori had in mind but an altogether different kind of 
wrong. Altogether different inasmuch as the violation, in human rights terms, 
could not have been the Pakeah deprivation of Maori birth-rights but rather the 
deprivation of land, in principle any land, which the Maori needed to ensure their 
basic human needs or to secure their cultural identity or some such. If this is the 
best proponents of the orthodox view can do, I find rather more enlightened the 
modern Pakeha response, as Hope describes it, to present Maori’s persistent 
insistence that the wrong at stake was a violation of birth-rights. Hope’s 
description of the Pakeha response is of a slow, grudging but reflective shift in 
perspective – a sort of half acknowledgement that Maori birth-rights might 
indeed have been violated, or that it is at least not unreasonable of the present 
Maori to talk in those terms. So contrary to the claims of the orthodox view, the 
Pakeha can in fact learn to acknowledge that Maori birth-rights might have been 
violated.          
 What, then, of the sense of injustice in contemporary traditional societies 
brought on by insistence on international human rights standards? Let me focus 
now on advocates of the political conception of human rights: what might be 
their response to Quashigah’s diagnosis by proponent? Proponents of this view 
might most naturally reach for a pragmatic response: tant pis, mais c’est la vie! 
We can’t always determine our fates, least of all our political ones, and 
sometimes it is best to reconcile ourselves with the way things panned out. This, 
after all, is how the conception of human rights came into being in the first place, 
according to the political conception. No a priori necessity attached to their 
emergence: human rights were a reasonable response to the disastrous 
consequences of tolerating a morally anarchic international order of states. Still, 
and despite the contingency of their emergence, human rights have proven 
extremely successful in establishing themselves as the new global lingua franca. 
No modern state today can decently keep the company of other states unless it 
demonstrates its broad respect for human rights domestically and 
internationally. Being in that sense fairly pragmatic, advocates of the political 
conception may acknowledge that some states or some parts of society will likely 
lose out, at least temporarily. Being pragmatic, they may well counsel caution – 
they may appreciate the ‘strains of commitment’ which members of traditional 
society and judges of modern courts invariably undergo in seeking to negotiate 
the slow passage from traditional practices to modern human rights respect. 
The problem with this imagined response to Quashigah is that Quashigah 
can agree with all of it: modern Ghana and other African states are constrained to 
go along with the new international dispensation – as noted, Quashigah is not 
urging a return to the pre-colonial status quo ante. To the contrary, he 
acknowledges the inescapability to modern African states of international 
human rights requirements. However, the pragmatic response does not silence 
Quasighah’s moral worry. Part of Quashigah’s moral worry is over what the 
insistence on international human rights standards does to the already fractured 
relationship between post-colonial state and citizen in Africa.4  As a creation of 
erstwhile colonial subjection modern constitutional law in Africa is already 
perceived as deeply untrustworthy by members of traditional society. Overly 
insistent pressure by the ‘international community’ for legally enforced domestic 
conformity with international human rights law often has the effect of deepening 
traditional members’ distrust of institutions that are nominally meant to be 
theirs. In short, unrestrained international enthusiasm for the newly emergent 
lingua franca can further to undermine the historically already fragile 
relationship between citizens and state in post-colonial Africa.  
Is the political conception able to respond to those concerns? In one sense 
the political conception (and indeed the orthodox view) should be sympathetic 
                                                        
4 Cf. Peter Ekeh, ‘Colonialism and the two publics in Africa: a theoretical 
statement’, Comparative Studies in Society and History 17 (1975), 91-112. 
to those concerns: after all, a morally tolerable relation between state and citizen 
are among the main desiderata of human rights advocacy. The trouble is that 
Quashigah believes that the law should track the socially transmitted sense of 
justice of those who are subject to its verdicts. Where instead, the law is seen, by 
those subject to it, as an imposition from on high, it stands to lose their 
allegiance. So for Quashigah the courts should not be made to impose 
international human rights requirements on those subject to their juridical 
authority – modern constitutional law can properly respond to human rights 
calls only when they come from below, i.e. from those who are to be subject to 
the courts’ verdicts. This is not, on the whole, how the political conception 
conceives the relation between state law and citizens. According to the political 
conception, states agree at international level to implement human rights law 
domestically. On this account, citizens are the domestic recipients of 
internationally agreed domestic law: the law is indeed imposed, once more, from 
on high. For Quashigah, this cannot bode well for the social acceptability of 
human rights law in post-colonial contexts. 
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